Showing posts with label psychology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label psychology. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Language and Theory of Mind


Introduction
In an article written by Michael Corballis (2004), autonomous speech is considered as a critical factor in how humans became modern. The article focuses on the development of language from one that was dependent on manual and facial gestures to one that is autonomously vocal. But is autonomous speech no longer dependent on manual and facial gestures and completely autonomous? To answer this question one must look closely at the origins of modern language and the interwoven relationships involved in language acquisition. A possible alternative to Corballis’ (2004) theory of autonomous speech is the theory that modern language is still dependent on manual and facial gestures; however mental evolution created an interwoven relationship between language, a secondary representation and covert imitation. The present meta-analysis examines literature that explains how human cognition is different from nonhuman animals in an attempt to find the missing link in cognition that led to the evolution of language.

Origins of Language
It is believed that modern language began with a primitive use of symbols without grammatical structure called protolanguage (Bickerton, 1995, as cited in Corballis, 2004). “Protolanguage is roughly equivalent to the level of language demonstrated by a 2-year-old child or a person with Broca’s aphasia” (p.544). Corballis (2004) makes a distinction between the evolution of language and the evolution of speech. He states that the evolution of language began with the mirror neurons. In monkeys the mirror neurons are located in area F5, which is equivalent to the area of the human brain known as the Broca’s area. The mirror neurons in monkeys were shown to respond not only when the monkey makes a particular movement but also when it observes the same movement performed by another monkey (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996, as cited in Corballis, 2004). But the mirror neurons in humans are different.
The mirror neurons in humans are not object dependent (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; as cited in Corballis, 2004) and may reflect a more abstract representational system. The mirror neurons are predominantly left hemispheric, as is the control of speech and are shown to be active when people “read” speech from facial gestures. The mirror neurons in humans would have the ability to interpret gestures into audible sounds, which could have evolved into words and even complete sentences (Corballis, 2004). But rather than autonomous speech being a human invention, it might have been the result of a genetic mutation.
The FOXP2 gene (forkhead box P2) on chromosome 7 is believed to play a role in incorporating speech into the mirror system of humans. A point mutation on the FOXP2 gene appears to be responsible for a speech and language disorder found in three generations of the KE family (Corballis, 2004). This gene has been called the “grammar gene” (Pinker, 1994, as cited in Corballis, 2004), however, the core deficit was seen in the articulation of phonological units. Further research has shown that subjects who carried the R328X mutation, a “nonsense” mutation on the FOXP2 gene different than the mutation carried by some of the KE family, had severe problems with communication (MacDermot et al. 2005). A closer look at the FOXP2 gene finds no evidence for its role in the evolution of vocal learning in non-humans (Webb, 2005) and found no association between the FOXP2 gene and autistic disorder (Gong et al. 2004), which also shows severe problems with communication. Perhaps the mutation of the FOXP2 gene allows us to examine the relationship between the mirror neurons and the representational skills involved in the evolution of language and theory of mind.
Thomas Suddendorf and Andrew Whiten (2001), explained how “a gradual rise of representational redescription may have made representations ever more explicit, enabled the development of a representational theory of mind, and to invent language” (p. 644). By using Perner’s (1991) representational capacities Suddendorf and Whiten tried to bridge the cognitive gap between humans and our closest relatives. Perner’s three stage model consists of a primary representation, a secondary representation, and a metarepresentation. In the first stage infants are limited to see things in reality. In the second stage children are able to take a primary representation of an object and go beyond reality to model hypothetical situations. A child no longer sees the banana as just a banana; now the banana could represent a phone or a gun. Pretend play becomes very important to the child. The final step in Perner’s representational model is metarepresentation which refers to representing a representation as a representation (Perner, 1991, as cited in Suddendorf et al., 2001). Theory of mind would only appear as a result of acquiring metarepresentations. Rather than focusing on the third stage, Suddendorf and Whiten compared secondary representations of humans with other animals.
Previous studies suggested that theory of mind was built around the pillar of false beliefs (Premack et al, 1978, as cited in Suddendorf, 2001), which would only be available for those animals that are capable of metarepresentations. These studies also showed no evidence of false beliefs in nonhuman primates (Call & Tomasello, 1999, as cited in Suddendorf, 2001). Suddendorf and Whiten (2001) suggest that the acquisition of theory of mind could be better understood through the representational capacities that lead up to a representational theory of mind. Perner’s (1991) secondary representation could also enhance our knowledge of representational capacities that lead up to language acquisition, such as hidden displacement and means-ends reasoning
In Piaget’s hidden displacement task, an object such as a ball is placed under a small box; which is then placed under a larger box. The small box reemerges empty. Perner (1991, as cited in Suddendorf, 2001) argued that in order for a child to pass this stage of object permanence one must not only have a present representation (an empty box), but also have a past or secondary representation of an object in the small box under the larger box. A child would also need to have this ability of representing the present objects as well as the past objects when using language. Perhaps passing a hidden displacement task is the precursor to understanding the causal relationship between present or recent representations objects and representations of objects in the past.
Another example of a secondary representational model is found in means-ends reasoning where one must be able to not only hold a present representation or primary perception in mind; but also a secondary representation of a desired goal. Then one must mentally manipulate the primary representation before acting on the environment (Suddendorf, 2001). Corballis (2004) used this means-end reasoning to explain how autonomous speech allows communication when obstacles intervene between the sender and the receiver. In this way, an object could be mentally represented and shared with another person. Then by sharing a secondary representation of the desired goal, pedagogy could be performed in the dark. However, both the sender and the receiver must be able to hold both representations in mind and mentally manipulate the present object to match the secondary object. But means-ends-reasoning is not only found in humans. There is substantial evidence showing that chimpanzees are able to express means-ends reasoning, as well as some evidence that gorillas and orangutans are able to use means-ends reasoning (Suddendorf, 2001). However, none of these animals have language or theory of mind. Rather than looking at the secondary representation, we need to take a closer look at how the perception of a primary representation is translated into an imitative representational model in the brain.
The Missing Link for Language
In a paper written by Margaret Wilson and Gűnther Knublich (2005), perception and imitation were examined. They found that “various brain areas involved in translating perceived human movement into corresponding motor programs collectively act as an emulator, internally simulating the ongoing perceived movement” (p.468). This emulation could then be used as overt imitation, working memory, or understanding others’ behavior. Their findings suggest that mirror neurons play a substantial role in creating covert imitations of the perceived environment. But the fact that mirror neurons are found in nonhuman primates that do not imitate and do not have theory of mind, leads one to question if the missing link in cognition is at the level of imitation or emulation. To further understand this concept we need to understand how covert imitation functions as an emulator in perceiving conspecifics.
According to Wilson and Knoblich (2005), conspecifics can be thought of as postures and actions primarily of other humans and the movements they make with their arms, legs, facial muscles, and vocal tracts. In humans these conspecifics are “covertly imitated, routinely and automatically” (p.460). One example of this can be seen in the chameleon effect showing the unconscious tendency for people to mimic the behavior of others’ or to mimic a person’s facial expression (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). Another example of imitation comes from observing infants. “Neonates show imitation of simple facial gestures such as mouth opening and tongue protrusion”(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; as cited in Wilson and Knoblich, 2005 p.461). Infants also show an ability to connect speech to corresponding motor representations. With these examples in mind, Wilson and Knoblich (2005) suggest that mirror neurons are an evolutionary precursor to imitation allowing humans to learn; understand other peoples’ actions, intentions and goals; and perhaps more importantly to develop a theory of mind. But mirror neurons are not enough to propel nonhuman animals to have greater cognitive abilities.
As mentioned earlier, the mirror neurons are believed to play a part in speech (Corballis, 2004). But nonhuman primates with mirror neurons do not speech or have language. Therefore there must be a second mechanism involved in language processing. “For language to be successful, users must be attuned to the functional equivalence between certain perceived and produced speech forms” and “covert imitation functions as part of a perceptual emulator, using implicit knowledge of one’s own body mechanics as a mental model to another person’s actions in real time” (Wilson, 2005, p.463). A closer look of mirror neurons in monkeys shows that the mirror neurons that respond to a hand grasping an object will also respond if the hand disappears behind a screen. This only happens if the monkey knows that there is an object behind the screen (Umilta et al., 2001; as cited in Wilson, 2005), which could suggest predictive capabilities of mirror neurons. The monkey would have a representation of the primary perception (hand with object) and without seeing the grasping action, activate the same neurons that would be activated if the monkey were to perform the same grasping behavior. Then why can’t monkeys with mirror neurons imitate?
Wilson and Knoblich (2005) state that unlike other animals humans have preexisting resources for representing the body and body movements that are perceived and covertly imitated. Evidence of this can be seen in functional MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) studies that show an activation of motor-related areas of the cortex while the subject observes movement of a hand, arm or mouth (Buccino et al., 2001; Graften, Arbib, Fadiga, & von Cramon, 2003; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 2000; as cited in Wilson & Bnoblich, 2005). They noted however, that movements that were impossible to imitate did not activate the motor-related areas (Stevens et al., 2000; as cited in Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). Another important fact is that the mirror neurons in humans seem to be active while an action is being imitated (Buccino, Vogt, et al., 2004; as cited in Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). This alone could show that covert imitation in the mirror neuron system played a large role in the evolution of language.
In conclusion, the factors that separate humans from nonhumans are language and theory of mind. But in order to understand how these factors separated us we need to look at the basic mechanisms involved. New research on the FOXP2 gene along with research on imitation and mirror neurons allow science to breakdown language and theory of mind into experimentally tested mechanisms. Rather than viewing language and theory of mind as a philosophical leap of consciousness, science has shown that simple mechanisms such as the ability to imitate motor control would allow humans to learn language through observations. Future studies could show that covert imitation of primary and secondary representations leads to metarepresentations found in theory of mind. The missing link in cognition could be simple covert imitation.















Works Cited

Corballis, M., (2004). The origins of Modernity: Was autonomous speech the critical factor? Psychological Review. Vol. 3, No. 2, 543-552.
Gong, X., Jia, M., Ruan, Y., Shuang, M., Liu, J., Wu, S., Guo, Y., Yang, J., Ling, Y., Yang, X., and Zhang, D. (2004). Association between the FOXP2 gene and autistic disorder in Chinese population. American Journal of Medical Genetics Part B (Neuropsychiatric Genetics). 127B:113-116.
MacDermot, K., Bonora, E., Sykes, N., Coupe, A., Lai, C., Vernes, S., Vargha-Khadem, F., McKenzie, F., Smith, R., Monaco, A., and Fisher, S. (2005). Identification of FOXP2 truncation as a novel cause of developmental speech and language deficits. Am. J. Hum. Genet. 76:1074-1080.
Terrace, H., Metcalfe, J., (2005). The missing link in cognition: Origins of self-reflective consciousness. Oxford University Press. New York.
Webb, D., Zhang, J., (2005). FOXP@ in song-learning birds and vocal-learning mammals. Journal of Heredity. 96(3):212-216.
Wilson, M., & Knoblich, G., (2005). The case for motor involvement in perceiving conspecifics. Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 131, No. 3, 460-473.

Independence or Insecurity

The Family Visit

The plane lands in Louisville’s Standiford Field on a beautiful spring day in May. My friend Michele has accompanied me to witness my baby brother graduating from law school. Michele is eager and excited to meet my parents and spend some quality time with them. I, on the other hand, am stressed and overflowing with anxiety. Although Michele has heard innumerable complaints about my parents, she still believes that I must be exaggerating. Michele could not believe that a parent-child relationship could be so dysfunctional and unattached. But, as I introduce Michele to my parents, her eyes begin to see a relationship very different from the one to which she and her parents are accustomed. Michele is very close to her parents and must be in contact with them on a regular basis. I on the other hand, have a very distant relationship with my parents and interact with them mostly out of obligation. In only a week, Michele has learned to appreciate the bond to which she has with her parents and the struggle I have establishing one with mine. As the week ends, I wonder how Michele’s parental relationship could be so different from mine. Why are some people very close to their parents and others very distant? Is attachment the cornerstone of social, psychological, and physical health? Could someone repair or replace these attachments later in life?






Methodology

This research paper originated more than 15 years ago as I searched for answers to my own psychological health and well being. In that search, I uncovered possible explanations for the problems I was facing. One explanation involves the relationship between a child and a parent or a caregiver. It is this relationship in which I am the most interested.
My paper reviews existing research and follows a child from a zygote, through childhood, young adulthood, and into adulthood. I show how various other behavioral researchers also use attachment in their investigations into human development and behavior. I will examine my own life and apply these theories to myself and my family and I will show how attachment is the cornerstone of a socially, psychologically, and physically healthy human being. Finally, I will show ways of overcoming attachment issues later in life. But where does attachment begin?





In The Beginning
After fertilization, a zygote grows and attaches to the mother’s womb. This physical attachment enables the embryo to receive nourishment and protection directly from the mother. As the embryo develops, a psychological attachment could also be developing. Before birth, the fetus is able to hear and sense environmental stimuli, respond to the mother’s voice, and develop preferences to certain sounds. This observation brings up a very important question: Could psychological attachment begin before birth? The answer might lie in genetic research and the study of temperament.
Temperament is the way in which a person interacts with his or her surroundings. Temperament is very important in the way a baby and a caregiver respond to each other. This could prove to be an important factor in establishing an attachment. “The New York Longitudinal Study (NYLS),” begun in 1956 by Alexander T. Thomas, Stella C. Chess, and Herbert B. Birch, is considered the pioneering study on temperament” (Papalia 202). The New York Longitudinal Study established three different styles of behavior in children. These categories were easy children, difficult children, and slow-to-warm-up children. The study also observed that goodness of fit was “the match between a child’s temperament and the environmental demands and constraints the child must deal with” (Papalia 203). The study observed personality and disposition differences in fetuses. This could suggest that temperament is inborn or inherited. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility that the environment or the mother’s behavior could have an effect on establishing the fetus’s temperament. Other studies also suggest that some aspects of attachment begin before the infant is born, such as the research on imprinting.
Newly hatched chicks will follow and become attached to the first moving object they see. The ethologist Konrad Lorenz, who got newborn ducklings to "love him like a mother," called this behavior imprinting. Thomas McAvoy/Life Magazine © Time Inc.

Konrad Lorenz also studied attachment in animals and believed that this mother-infant bond was a genetic characteristic. In his research, he observed newborn ducklings and found that they formed an attachment to the first moving object that they saw. Lorenz called this imprinting and observed it in adopted babies and caregivers other than the mother. Perhaps imprinting could also be found in newborn human infants and developing fetuses could be the important building-block of attachment. Konrad Lorenz observed a critical period of development. In this critical period of imprinting, the newborn ducklings formed an attachment. Could humans also have a critical period of attachment?
“A critical period is a specific time when a given event, or its absence, has the greatest impact on development. For example, if a woman receives X rays, takes certain drugs, or contracts certain diseases at certain times during pregnancy, the fetus may show specific ill effects. The amount and kind of damage will vary, depending on the nature of the "shock" and on its timing” (Papalia 118). The concept of a critical period was used in language acquisition. Eric Lenneberg proposed that there was a small window in which a child could learn a language. He believed that this period was from infancy to around puberty. If language was not learned in that timeframe, the child will have inadequate language skills. Perhaps there is a critical period for establishing an attachment either before birth or as soon as the fetus becomes fully developed and is born.





The Baby is Born
From birth until the age of 3, the child grows in one of the most critical periods of attachment. Mary Ainsworth was interested in researching attachment in a child’s most critical period. Her research uncovered just how important this relationship is for both the child and the parent or caregiver. Attachment is defined as “a reciprocal, enduring emotional tie between an infant and a caregiver, each of whom contributes to the quality of the relationship” (Papalia 211). In studying patterns of attachment, Ainsworth was able to observe the relationship between children and their caregivers. She then classified the behavior of each child into distinguishable patterns. These patterns of behavior were observed in 1 year old babies and were called secure attachment, avoidant attachment, ambivalent, or resistant attachment. Later, another pattern of behavior was added because of additional research. This forth pattern was called disorganized-disoriented attachment. However, before one can classify a particular behavior, one must first understand how attachment is established.
Ainsworth explained how babies and adults respond to certain behaviors such as crying or smiling. The simple touch of a mother’s skin, the smell of her perfume, and the sound of her voice all establish an attachment. Although a baby may not respond differently to people in his or her surroundings for the first 2 months, he or she learns to move toward the mother after only 8 to 12 weeks. This is observed when babies cry if someone, other than the mother, holds the baby or the baby actively searches for the mother with his or her eyes. By 6 or 7 months, a baby’s attachment to the mother is more defined. Fear of strangers could appear at anytime between 6 and 8 months. Ainsworth used this concept of fear of strangers as a way to assess attachment. She also observed the children in their homes. In order to achieve reliable results, babies were studied in a controlled environment and were subjected to a technique called a “strange situation.” In this form of a laboratory experiment, the baby’s attachment to the mother or caregiver can be adequately classified (Papalia 211).
Classifying a child’s behavior in a strange situation is very important in establishing the type of child-caregiver attachment. The child’s behavior is observed when the mother is present, as the mother leaves the room, while she is absent, and as she returns. The child’s behavior determines which form of attachment is present between the mother and the child. If the baby uses the mother as a form of security and appears content and happy in her presence, the baby is considered to be securely attached. In this form of attachment, the child becomes very upset if the mother leaves the room and is very happy when she returns (Papalia 212). The babies who do not appear to use the mother as a security figure and do not go to her in times of need are considered to be in an insecurely attached relationship. This is also called avoidant attachment. In this form of attachment children tend to be more angry, dislike being held, and dislike being put down. Another form of an insecure attachment is called ambivalent or resistant attachment. In this form of attachment, the child sends mixed signals to the mother. The child may seek out the mother while at the same time resisting contact. “Resistant babies do little exploration and are hard to comfort” (Papalia 212).
Disorganized-disoriented attachment was added to the list of attachment patterns as research continued in the field of child behavior. The babies with disorganized-disoriented attachments appear to be the most insecurely attached of all children. Their behavior is not consistent and may show behaviors of all patterns. One minute the baby could appear happy when the mother returns and the next minute appear ambivalent or resistant. “It is most likely to occur in babies whose mothers are single or are insensitive, intrusive, or abusive (Papalia 212). No matter which form of attachment an infant has, he or she must still grow and develop. Perhaps the picture below shows how strong the idea of attachment truly is and that a duckling, baby monkey, or child will find attachment without a mother.

In a series of classic experiments, Harry Harlow and Margaret Harlow showed that food is not the most important way to a baby's heart. When infant rhesus monkeys could choose whether to go to a wire surrogate "mother" or a warm, soft terry-cloth "mother," they spent more time clinging to the cloth mother, even if they were being fed by bottles connected to the wire mother.Harry Harlow Primate Laboratory, University of Wisconsin

Growing Up Unattached
As the infant grows and develops, his or her senses begin to operate. The brain of the baby is very sensitive to the environment allowing him or her to learn and remember, even early in life. The research of Harry and Margaret Harlow showed a different aspect of attachment. They showed that monkeys that were raised with a soft cloth surrogate mother were more likely to explore. One could compare these monkeys to securely attached children. The monkeys that were raise with only a wire surrogate mother were not as willing to explore but were also not securely attached. So what happens to children who are not securely attached? It appears that most psychologists, theorists, and researchers, attribute some, if not all, of psychological dysfunction to attachment.
Sigmund Freud was the first person to show how attachment is important in a child’s development. He believed that boys develop a sexual attachment to their mothers and girls to their fathers. Although many dispute Freud’s psychosexual stages, he was able to show that development occurred in stages. He was also the first researcher to show the importance of the mother or caregiver.
Erik Erikson followed in Freud’s footsteps and viewed development has periodic hurdles that must be successfully jumped. Erikson called his developmental crises psychosocial stages. Erikson showed how important the child’s attachment to the mother was in the child’s development. The first stages are basic trust versus basic mistrust and autonomy versus shame and doubt. One could easily understand that problems with attachment could prevent a child from successfully passing these crises. Should a child develop a basic mistrust perhaps this could lead that child into developing shame and doubt. But is every insecurely attached child destined for failure?
Erikson’s first stage of basic trust versus basic mistrust is very dependent on the relationship between the mother and the child. One would theorize that an insecurely attached child would develop a basic mistrust. Perhaps the answer could be found in Harlow’s experiment of infant rhesus monkeys. Without a mother, some of the monkeys developed an attachment for an artificial clothe mother. Those monkeys that were given the clothe monkey and became attached behaved similarly to securely attached children. As the research continued, it was observed that the monkeys did not grow up naturally and were unable to nurture there offspring. One could then argue that Harlow’s monkeys did not successfully pass through Erikson’s stages of development due to an inadequate mother-child attachment. Unlike Harlow’s rhesus monkeys, human children are able to find more alternatives and perhaps better solutions. As Erikson’s research continued, he realized that his psychosocial stages of development could be revisited and revised. If a child did not successfully pass one stage, he or she could successfully pass through that stage later in life. Successful passing of stages could be accomplished through learning.




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Finding Alternative Attachments

Thankfully, not every psychologist, theorist, and researcher believes that a child’s attachment is the only marker of a psychologically healthy future. Many see a child as an independent organism that has choices. These behavioral choices are learned from experience or adapted from the environment. The learning perspective tries to explain the laws that govern behavior. Children learn through conditioning by using rewards, reinforcement, and punishment as the major factors for change. In this perspective, an insecurely attached child could learn the behavior that is needed for proper development. Classical conditioning could also be used to remove undesirable behavior. Social-learning theorists consider that children learn in a social context by observing and imitating other people around them. As a child eventually grows and interacts with his or her environment, the norms of behavior are constantly being tested. The behavior of an avoidant child could be just as unacceptable as that of a securely attached child. On the first day of the new kindergarten class, all of the students must leave their mothers. Securely attached students must learn to accept the absence of their mother.
Reflecting this research onto my own life, I could understand the important of learning in psychological development. Perhaps my attachment as a child could be considered as avoidant, ambivalent, or resistant. But I strongly believe that my extended family created an alternative to the traditional mother-child relationship. By finding alternative attachments and learning from others, I could pass each psychosocial stage. Urie Bronfenbrenner also believed that development occurs through interactions between a child and his or her surroundings. The bioecological theory uses “five interlocking contextual systems of influences, from microsystem to chronosystem” (Papalia 30).
Letting Go

As an adult, one could easily find a mother, father, or caregiver as the root of all psychological problems in which are inflicting an enormous amount of pain and anguish. But by stating that the child is unable to remedy situation as an adult, one must also state that the mother, father, or caregiver, is also confined to that same rule. Would this mean that a child from an unfit mother must become an unfit mother? Would this also mean that an insecurely attached child will only raise other insecurely attached children? Research is finally showing another aspect of development. Modern perspectives consider that individuals have the power to foster their own positive, healthy development. Therefore, no one is at fault or everyone is at fault.
As a child develops into an adult, he or she is faced with many challenges in his or her behavior and thought. The humanistic perspective considers that people have the ability to change their lives and encourage their own development. Abraham Maslow’s self-actualization theory places the power of psychological development back into the individual’s hands. Through the hierarchy of needs a person can rise from only having safety and security to becoming self-actualized.
My best friend Michele and I once again board the plane. This time we are returning to New York after a week with my parents. As wheels leave the ground, Michele turns to me and says: “I’m so glad we going home.” I tell her: “So am I.” Although I am happy to return to the life I have established, I find myself still wanting to be near my parents. Although my attachment may not have been Mary Ainsworth’s best choice, it was my only choice. As I become older and hopefully wiser, I realize that attachment is important in development but is not a clear marker for future psychological health. It is but one more step on a stairwell to somewhere. Although it is more difficult to climb steps without using every step, one could still reach the highest step.














Work Cited
Comer, F. J. Fundamentals of Abnormal Psychology. (3rd ed.). New York: Worth Publishers, 2002
Papalia, Danel E., Sally Wendkos Olds, Ruth Duskin Feldman. Human Development. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001